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 3 
Introduction 
The country of Rwanda has been the subject of international attention since the 
early 1990s. During that decade, an ethnically based civil war was followed by one of the 
worst genocides in contemporary history. Therefore, modern history in Rwanda has been 
deeply influenced by those memories; by mid-July 1994, after three months of genocide, 
more than 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been indiscriminately killed by the 
Hutus involved in the massacre.1 
Contrary to what one might have expected, Rwanda did not become a failed or 
fragile state after those events. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which originated as a 
guerrilla movement, rapidly transformed into a political party and took control of the 
country, focusing its efforts on ethnic reconciliation.2 Nevertheless, this paramount 
reconciliation gained priority over the democratic process that started in Rwanda with the 
Arusha Accords a few years before the start of the civil war.3 Paul Kagame officially took 
office in 2000 and under his rule the country has experienced enormous gains in the form 
of socioeconomic development, gender equality and accountability for genocide 
perpetrators.4 However, when asked about the democratization process expected by the 
international community, some talk in terms of the “Rwandan exception”5 ; under 
Kagame’s administration ethnic reconciliation has been prioritized over democracy.6 
Controversial elements surrounding Kagame’s government, such as restricted freedom of 
speech, repeated human rights violations and a narrow political terrain, have been present 
since he took power.7 Altogether, these are undoubtedly constraining people’s liberties. 
Albeit elections are held, they are considered fraudulent, and control is applied to nearly 
every facet of society.8  These elements point to Rwanda as being an authoritarian state.9 
                                               
1 Phil Clark. “After genocide: democracy in Rwanda, 20 years on”. Juncture, vol. 20, 2014. Pg. 308.  
2 Richard Youngs. “A new approach in the Great Lakes? Europe's evolving conflict-resolution strategies”. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 22:3, 2004. Pg.311. 
3 The Arusha Accords in 1990 was a process involving the RPF and other excluded Rwandan political parties 
aimed to bring shared governance in Rwanda. John H. Stanfield. “Rwanda: Rough Macro- Sociology of 
Knowledge Notes on a Symbolic Emergence of a Post– Cold War African Nation”. American Behavioral 
Scientist. SAGE Publications, 2012. Pg. 1336. 
4 Clark, Pg. 308.  
5 Youngs, pg, 112. 
6 Ibid, pg, 113.  
7 Rachel Hayman. “Going in the “Right” Direction? Promotion of Democracy in Rwanda since 1990”. 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, No.1, 2009. Pg. 54.  
8 Stephen Brown. “‘Well, what can you expect?’: donor officials' apologetics for hybrid regimes in Africa”. 
Democratization. (Roudledge, Ottawa, 2011). Vol. 18 : 2.  Pg. 516.  
9 Hayman, pg. 53. 
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Although the international community is generally considered to have shown 
apparent and even deliberate indifference when the killings transpired in 1994, foreign 
involvement joined the national efforts in the reconstruction of the country during the 
aftermath of the genocide. Rwanda was deeply harmed economic, social and politically 
after the horrific event, and had to be rebuilt. Peace, democracy and reconciliation were to 
be at the cornerstone of Rwanda’s future. Among many other actors, it is the specific 
involvement of the European Union (EU) that is brought into focus in this thesis. The EU 
is an important international donor, deeply engaged with third countries and considered a 
normative power in world politics.10 The Union claims to “be founded on a strong 
engagement to promote and protect human rights, democracy and rule of law 
worldwide”.11 It has been present in Rwanda since the late 1980s, and during these years of 
collaboration, efforts to promote good governance and democratic principles have been 
implemented.12  
According to Hackenesch, whose classification model is applied in this thesis, there 
are three strategies the EU follows when implementing pro-democracy strategies in third 
countries: cooperation, criticism or confrontation. Over these years of collaboration, the 
three approaches have been applied to Rwanda. The EU criticised the country in the early 
2000s, mainly due to the use of coercive practices by Kagame’s administration against 
political opposition and the civil society. The Union employed an increasingly aggressive 
stance from 2012 onwards, when a clear confrontation strategy was adopted after the UN 
published a report accusing Rwanda of being actively involved in the RDC conflict.13 On 
the contrary, a mere cooperative strategy was put in practice between 2005 and 2012. The 
cooperative approach implies a “reluctance to exert pressure but merely relies on political 
and aid-policy dialogues as well as democracy aid to support reforms”.14 In this case, the 
EU avoided the use of sanctions and criticism. However, at that moment, the government 
of Rwanda was employing several low-intensity coercion actions, such as the 
implementation of restrictive laws or the arrest of defecting RPF members.15   
                                               
10 Milja Kurki.  “Political Economy Perspective” in The substance of  EU democracy promotion: Concepts and Cases, 
ed. Anna Wetzel and Jan Orbie. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Pg. 35.    
11 European Union External Action. “Human rights and democracy”. Accessed 15 July, 2016. 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/index_en.htm.  
12 “Political and economic relation”. Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Rwanda, EEAS. 
Accessed 30 April 2016. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/eu_rwanda/political_economic_relations/index_en.htm 
13 Cristine Hackenesch. “It’s Domestic Politics, Stupid! EU Democracy Promotion Strategies Meet African 
Dominant Party Regimes”. World Development. Vol. 75, 2015. Pg. 91.  
14 Ibid, pg. 89.   
15 Hackenesch, pg. 91.    
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The combination of these elements opens a discussion about the causes of switch 
in the strategy by the EU. Repressive regime survival practices were employed in Rwanda, 
nevertheless the EU took another approach this time. Simultaneously, similar situations of 
government repression in countries such as Guinea and Niger resulted in different 
responses from the EU during the same time frame.16 Thus, the research question this 
thesis aims to answer is: Why did the EU adopt a cooperative pro-democracy strategy in Rwanda 
from 2005 to 2012? 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the levels of stability and development in 
Rwanda during 2005 – 2012 are the main reasons why the EU chose a cooperative strategy. 
This hypothesis relies on the instrumental variation sometimes present in democracy 
promotion. This paper understands instrumental variation by the EU as the use or non-use 
of sanctions to boost democracy depending on the interests of the EU or the specific 
circumstances of the recipient country.17 As Karen del Biondo elaborates, “sanctions are 
more likely in the case of grave violations of democracy and human rights, in countries that 
are unstable and economically underperforming”.18  
The time frame of this study is 2005 to 2012. The 2000s were a pivotal decade for 
Rwanda in terms of democratization. With the new millennium, and after the resignation of 
President Pasteur Bizimungu, Paul Kagame officially took office in Rwanda.19 That same 
year, the Cotonou Agreement20 was signed, establishing a new framework of collaboration 
between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.21 During the 
transition period (1994 – 2003), the regime was unstable and the government faced 
constant internal opposition.22 In the early 2000s, key members of the party defected and 
tensions between Tutsis arose, which represented a deep political crisis,23 while the EU was 
applying a criticism strategy. The first Presidential elections were held, whose result 
                                               
16 Karen del Biondo. “Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion 
in Africa”. Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume 53. Number 2, 2015. Pg. 238.  
17 Ibid, pg. 237 
18 Ibid.  
19 “Kagame elected Rwandan president”. BBC News, 17 April 2000. Accessed 23 October 2016.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/716861.stm.   
20 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement is a treaty between 78 ACP countries and the EU aimed to be the 
framework for cooperation partnerships treaties during the period 2000 - 2020. Replacing the former Lomé 
Convention, the Cotonou Agreement had the objective of reducing poverty while focusing on human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law. 
21 Gordon Crawford. “The EU and Democracy Promotion in Africa: High on rhetoric, low on delivery?” in 
EU development policy in a Changing World, ed. Andrew Mold. Amsterdam University Press, 2007. Pg. 174. 
22 Filip Reyntjens. “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship”. African studies. Royal African 
Society. Published 1 April 2004. Pg. 180.  
23 Reyntjens, pg. 181.   
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triggered expression of concerns from the EU due to “fraud, intimidation, manipulation of 
electoral lists, and lack of transparency in the counting procedure”24; Paul Kagame was the 
absolute winner with the 94% of the votes.25 It is from 2005 when the regime finally 
stabilizes, partly thanks to the government efforts to avoid opposition26 and criticism.27 
Here, the EU applied a cooperative strategy. But in 2012 the country faced renewed 
uncertainty when Kagame’s administration was accused by the United Nations to be 
actively involved in the DRC conflict.28 The fact that the period 2005 – 2012 was politically 
more stable than the previous and the posterior periods is taken as an assumption in this 
thesis. This paper has selected this time frame owing to the stability of Rwanda during it, 
justifying the use of the cooperative approach by the EU. Thus, Rwanda is not compared 
in this thesis to its own past and post situations, but to two other African countries, Niger 
and Guinea, experiencing similar characteristics during the same time frame.    
Coercive practices are another key element of this paper. An authoritarian regime 
uses different strategies to maintain its position of power, and ensure its political survival. 
Among others methods, coercion is one of the main practices authoritarian leaders use. 
Coercion involves formal and informal forms of intimidation of individuals, such as regime 
critics, or groups, such as the general civil society, along with restriction in the media’s and 
political opposition freedoms.29 According to Levitsky & Way, governments can use high 
levels (brutal repression involving violence) or low levels of coercion (intimidation or 
media restrictions). As the paper will develop in following sections, the Rwandan 
government has used a wide range of techniques to secure its position, and its leader has 
been described by scholars such as Filip Reyntjens as “probably the worst war criminal in 
office today.”30  
 
 
                                               
24 Reyntjens, pg. 186.  
25 James Astill. “Rwandan leader wins 94% of vote”. The Guardian, 27 August 2003. Accessed 23 October 
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/27/jamesastill.   
26 The Democratic Republican Front (MDR), the main party in the opposition, was banned in 2003.  
27 Hackenesch., pg. 90.  
28 United Nations, Security Council. “Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
addressed to the President of the Security Council “. S/2012/843. 15 November 2012. Pg, 3.   
29 Hackenesch, pg. 87. 
30 French, Howard. “The case against Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame”. Newsweek, 14 January 2010. 
Accessed 23 October 2016. http://europe.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-
63167?rm=eu. 
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Literature review 
This section presents a literature review on the existing scholarship relating to the 
topic of Rwanda and the EU’s democracy promotion. Firstly, a general overview of EU 
democracy promotion will clarify the essence, motivation and characteristics of it. 
Secondly, attention will be paid to authoritarian regimes and how donors deal with them. 
Finally, a deeper look into the general democratization trends in Rwanda in undertaken.  
The European Union and Democracy promotion 
In order to answer the research question, it is crucial to first understand how EU 
democratization strategy is conceived and contextualized.   
When assessing aid in general terms, the EU is one of the major donors in the 
world and is considered a positive normative power in World Politics.31 The reduction of 
poverty through the implementation of development programs is claimed to be its first 
objective, although the Union has diversified the distribution of aid by contributing to new 
sectors, such as democracy promotion. This is claimed to be one of the core objectives of 
the current EU development policy.32 Democracy promotion is defined as “aid given with 
the explicit goal of advancing democracy overseas”.33  
A shift in priorities was implemented with the new century; democracy aid passed 
from being comparatively small in relative and absolute terms, to a considerable increase of 
its budgetary volume and range of instruments.34 According to the OECD Development 
Assistance Creditor Database, the budget of pro-democracy EU aid to African countries 
increased from 3% in 1995 to 11% in 2010. This can be translated as an amount of USD 
50 million to USD 550 million.35  
The EU promotes human rights and democracy in third countries through its 
budget for foreign assistance. This budget is managed by the European Commission (EC) 
with its Development and Cooperation Aid office. However, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which coordinates EU foreign and security policy, the Parliament 
                                               
31 Kurki, pg. 35.   
32 European Commission - International Cooperation and Development. “Mission Statement”. Accessed 22 
January, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mission-statement_en 
33 Sarah Sunn Bush. “Introduction and argument”. The taming of democracy assistance: why democracy promotion does 
not confront dictators. Cambridge University Press. 2015. Pg. 4.  
34 Hackenesch, pg. 86.  
35 Ibid, pg. 94.  
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and the European Council also play a crucial role in contributing to the diplomatic 
mechanisms.36 Subsequently, the EU as a whole is examined in this thesis.  
Perceptions on EU democracy promotion 
In order to understand how other actors and public opinion perceive its 
application, the perception of the policy is also important. EU democracy promotion raises 
different opinions among scholarship. Many are sceptical about the policy, such as Stephen 
Hurt in Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest. Hurt argues 
that since the EU development policy emanates from self-interest, trade is prioritized over 
democracy. Additionally, there is a lack of coherence between the member states’ policies 
and the ones implemented by the Union.37 Gorm Rye Olsen similarly argues that individual 
member states’ interests in Africa differ from the EU common ones,38 which can 
complicate the decision making. Furthermore, Olsen claims that the multiple references to 
“respect for human rights and democratic principles” made by the EU just serve to 
enhance its moral profile and reputation as a normative-oriented actor in the international 
framework. Lastly, it is said that self-interest designs the policy; opinion that is shared by 
Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie. They locate security interests at the centre of the motivation 
to promote democracy. Wetzel and Orbie find support for the fact that security trumps 
democracy: if security is being threatened by democracy, this last will be undermined.39 
Thus, in the reviewed literature, democracy promotion is a controversial and highly 
criticized aspect of the European external policy.  
The EU defines democracy promotion as “aid given with the explicit goal of 
advancing democracy overseas”, which is a broad concept.40 Likewise, the type of 
democracy that it is promoted is suspected to have a (neo)-liberal approach.41 Gordon 
Crawford maintains that democracy promotion by the EU is exclusively aimed towards 
where the Union has economic interests. As a result, the policy is turned into an 
instrumental rather than a normative element. Crawford also argues that democracy in a 
                                               
36 Rosa Balfour. “European Union”. Supporting Democracy Abroad: An Assessment of  Leading Powers. The 
Freedom House, 2012. Pg. 1. 
37 Stephen R. Hurt.  Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest? Third 
World Quarterly, 31:1, 2010. Pg. 159-168.  
38 Gorm Rye Olsen. “Changing European concerns: security and complex political emergencies instead of 
development” in EU development cooperation: From model to symbol, ed. Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. Pg. 96.  
39 Wetzel, Anne and Orbie, Jan. “Introduction”. The substance of EU democracy promotion. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.   
40 Sunn Bush. pg. 4.  
41 Kurki. pg. 38. 
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country cannot be imposed by external forces: the international actors promoting 
democracy should only have a supportive role in the process. The instrumental use of 
democracy promotion by the EU is equally studied by Karen Del Biondo. The reasons 
given by Del Biondo to justify this instrumental variation lead to the following conclusion: 
depending on EU interests in each recipient country, but also the specific circumstances 
surrounding each regime, the use of economic sanctions to boost democracy will be 
applied or not.  
This section elucidates scholarly scepticism about the EU democracy promotion 
strategy. The supposed instrumentality of the policy, economic and security interests and 
the often used neo-liberal approach are the main critiques it receives. These general 
premises support the hypothesis that the EU adapted its democracy promotion strategy to 
the situation in Rwanda, in relation to the level of stability of the country.   
Nevertheless, the framework under which this scholarship has analyzed the EU’s 
democracy promotion suffers from an approach that is too general to allow for consistent 
conclusions about the case of Rwanda. Therefore, it is crucial to explore how the policy is 
applied in relation to authoritarian regimes like Rwanda. 
Democracy promotion in authoritarian regimes  
It might seem self-evident that a pro-democracy policy will be implemented in 
countries with low democratic standards. Nevertheless, this category of countries might 
include weak democracies as well as established authoritarian regimes. The category and the 
specific circumstances surrounding the ruling regime in a country will determine the use of 
one strategy over another. It is important for this thesis to differentiate the different ways 
how democracy can be promoted, paying special attention to authoritarian regimes.  
Democracy promotion strategies  
The attitude of the ruling government, the level of civil society liberties and the 
existence of a consistent opposition are some of the elements that can influence the 
strategy used by donors dealing with the implementation of democracy in authoritarian 
regimes. Donors contributing to democracy promotion can combine two approaches 
during this process: to reward or to punish. Both approaches involve methods differing 
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from diplomacy to economic sanctions or political conditionality42, among others.43 In 
addition, sponsored activities and specific projects to promote democracy are implemented 
by actors such as government agencies, NGOs and multilateral institutions, with the goal 
of fostering democracy.44  
Authoritarian regimes’ collaboration with democracy promoters 
Promotion of democracy by Western donors often faces reluctance from the 
governing parties where the democratic system has to be implemented. Some of these 
regimes might collaborate while others might not, depending on the circumstances. The 
new EU democracy aid agenda, implemented in 2000, incorporated new instruments and 
practices, such as aid coordination dialogs with the recipient countries. Consequently, 
engagement and collaboration of governments when designing aid strategies for each 
country, especially in Africa, is of paramount importance.45  
 Among the different authoritarianisms, this thesis pays particular attention to 
dominant party systems; this is the form of governance present in Rwanda under the RPF 
leadership. In this type of regimes, elections are held and other parties are partly permitted 
to exist, even though one main party has the complete control of the political arena. In 
these authoritarian regimes, political leaders naturally seek to maximize their chances to 
remain in office, and there is a clear relation between regime survival tactics and these 
governments’ willingness to engage with external democracy promotion. The less 
opposition the regime faces, the more likely it is to accept democratic reforms.46 The main 
reason why an authoritarian regime would collaborate with the EU in terms of 
democratization is to maintain other benefits it can receive from it, such as development 
aid.47 This occurs when political conditionality is used as a mean to foster democracy. 
Political conditionality constitutes a key tool for democratization. However, some African 
leaders have learnt how to make the minimum required reforms in order to maintain their 
levels of aid without real democratic commitment48, by building a democratic façade. For 
                                               
42 Political conditionality is defined as “the explicit use of aid to impose political conditions on recipient 
countries”. Carolyn Baylies. “Political Conditionality and democratization”. Review of African Political Economy.   
ROAPE Publications Ltd. Vol. 65, 1995. Pg. 321. 
43
 Sunn Bush., pg. 6.  
44 Sunn Bush, pg. 7.    
45 Hackenesch, pg. 86.  
46 Ibid, pg. 87.  
47 Ibid, pg. 88.   
48 Stephen Brown. “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa”. The European Journal of 
Development Research. Vol.17, No.2, June 2005. Pg. 184.  
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example, they might allow other parties to exist, but never win; permit some independent 
press, without being entirely free; allow civil society to organize, but with high restrictions. 
These practices are used by these regimes as a proof of their implication with the 
implementation of reforms, while actually resisting democratization.49 However, despite 
these implications, conditionality can also achieve the desired effects, since it constitutes a 
chance to open the political space and to give an opportunity to opposition, while raising 
the cost of continued authoritarian practices.50  
EU pro-democracy response to authoritarian regimes 
Cristine Hackenesch argues that depending on the response an authoritarian regime 
gives to democracy promotion, the EU adopts one out of three different strategies:  
confrontation, criticism or cooperation (See table 1). The “confrontation” strategy involves 
budget support suspensions and sanctions, which can be applied under the Article 96 of 
the Cotonou Agreement. “Criticism” concerns “naming & shaming” or shifting aid funds. 
Public statements can be effective to harm the image of a regime, while the reallocation of 
aid to some specific sectors can be used to send a clear message about political aspects the 
EU does not side with. Finally, the “cooperation” approach, mostly employed when the 
government actively collaborates, relies on political dialogue and democratic aid to support 
reforms.51  
 
Table 1.  EU democracy promotion strategies.  
Authoritarian domestic politics 
Opposition challenge  Government response 
EU strategy Factors influencing EU strategy 
Mass Opposition 
High-intensity coercion 
Confrontation 
Geo-strategic, economic and security 
interests 
Development-policy goals and interests 
Domestic institutions and public opinion 
Unwilling to engage with EU on 
political reforms 
Elite defection 
and imminent 
challenge 
Low-intensity coercion 
Criticism or 
cooperation 
Reluctant engagement on political 
reforms 
Elite defection 
but no imminent 
challenge 
Low-intensity coercion 
Criticism or 
cooperation 
Active engagement with EU on 
political reforms 
Source: Hackenesch., pg. 87. 
                                               
49 Brown, pg. 184. 
50 Brown, pg. 193.  
51 Hackenesch, pg. 88.   
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At the same time, the level of coercion the regime exerts towards opposition, public 
opinion or media, with the aim to maintain its position, also influences the EU strategy. 
High levels of coercion are not easily ignored, and the EU public opinion or member states 
are more likely to pressure the EU to respond against them.52 However, low-intensity 
coercion permits the EU to be more flexible in choosing strategies, because the pressure 
from other actors is lower.53 This is particularly relevant in those authoritarian regimes with 
a democratic façade like Rwanda, covering authoritarianism under democratic institutions 
or elections. In these cases, the EU is less likely to use confrontation strategies, because it is 
harder to decide whether the country is evolving to a democratic system or not.54  
Other studies show that democracy assistance does not directly confront dictators, 
as it used to do in the 1980s.55 Practices have transformed from challenging autocrats by 
supporting opposition parties and unions, to a less aggressive approach such as the support 
of technical programs to improve local governance.56 Even in countries that have remained 
authoritarian for an extended time period, confrontational strategies have been generally 
replaced by activities that emphasize democracy. An illustrative example is a women’s 
representation program: they do not inherently pose a threat for the dictator, but promote 
gender equality in politics, which is seen as necessary for democracy.57 In some cases, 
authoritarian governments have profited from these practices. Democracy assistance 
programs can play a role into dictator’s survival strategies: they can increase the regime’s 
popularity among the population.58 Therefore regime-compatible programs – not those that 
challenge the dictator - are more likely to survive. Yet, leaders in non-democratic countries 
generally try to avoid as much as possible democracy promotion and assistance when they 
constitute a threat for them, and they have mechanisms to do so, such as imposing legal 
restriction to foreign aid.59 
 This section has dealt with the topic of authoritarian regimes and democracy 
assistance. In sum, dealing with dictators is a sensitive task. Both sides’ interests meet in the 
democratization strategies implemented by donors, which often have to be applied in 
collaboration with the recipient government. Although donors have tools to fight bad 
                                               
52 Hackenesch, pg. 89.   
53 Ibid.   
54 Ibid.  
55 Sunn Bush, pg.5.  
56 Ibid.   
57 Sunn Bush, pg. 22.  
58 Ibid pg. 23.   
59 Ibid, pg. 43.  
   
 
 13 
practices used by these governments, new trends in democracy promotion avoid the 
confrontation of dictators when possible. Donors such as the EU adapt their strategies 
taking into account the domestic politics of the country, but also external elements such as 
the pressure they receive from other actors. This section is particularly relevant to 
understand why the EU behaves in a specific way while dealing with authoritarian regimes.    
Democracy promotion in Rwanda  
Considering the special circumstances surrounding Rwanda, there are case-specific 
elements that need unravelling in order to draw a clear picture of the situation. These 
elements are the dominant party system present in the country, the post-genocide situation 
and the influence the Rwandan government has over aid.  
Authoritarianism in Rwanda 
The “third wave of democratization” in Africa, in the early 1990s, did not hit 
Rwanda as expected but rather led the country towards authoritarianism in the form of a 
dominant party system.60 Rwanda was rebuilt during the transition period under the 
leadership of the RPF after 1994. In 2000 after the resignation of President Pasteur 
Bizimungu, Paul Kagame replaced him as president, although he had already been the de 
facto leader of the country for years.61 Ever since, the RPF controls the political arena in 
Rwanda, and does not allow real opposition to exist. Elections are held, although they are 
marred by numerous irregularities, such as the imprisonment of main opposition 
candidates, as it happened in 2003 and 2010 presidential elections.62 The ruling party does 
not tolerate criticism by civil society organizations, other parties or media,63 and exerts 
coercion to potential threats to the regime64, such as defecting members of the elite.65 
Critics are often persecuted for “genocide ideology” charges66 and civil liberties are limited.   
 
 
                                               
60 Hackenesch, pg. 85.   
61 “Kagame elected Rwandan president”. BBC News, 17 April 2000. Accessed 23 October 2016.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/716861.stm.   
62 Brown pg. 516.  
63 Ibid.   
64 Rice, Xan. “Rwandan opposition leader found dead”. The guardian, 14 July 2010. Accessed 26 October 
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/14/rwanda-opposition-politician-found-dead.  
65 Garrison, Ann. “Kagame arrests Rwandan presidential candidate Bernard Ntaganda”. Digital Journal, 24 
June 2010. Accessed 26 October 2016. http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/293800. 
66 Brown, pg. 516.   
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The post-conflict situation in Rwanda 
The post-conflict situation in Rwanda is a relevant element not to be disregarded, 
although this analysis starts more than ten years after the genocide. Political theorists, such 
as Huntington or Machiavelli, are generally sceptical about the likeliness of democracy 
arising after a civil war.67 Post-war democratization is considered a new field, because it 
joins two previously existing areas: transition from authoritarianism to democracy and 
transition from war to peace. The researchers involved in a project called External Democracy 
Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies by the Free University of Berlin, 
claim that it is possible that the factors affecting a mere transition to democracy might 
change in a post-conflict setting. Success in these cases might be disaggregated: it can be 
translated as an “absence of war” or regarding to the “democratic quality of the regime”.68 
In Rwanda, the genocide marked a rupture in the pro-democracy aid agenda that was led by 
the Arusha Accords, and the existing external democratic pressures were postponed in 
favour to the application of urgent humanitarian measures to support those affected by the 
violence, and reach reconciliation.69 In consequence, this thesis understands stability as an 
absence of war, in comparison to Rwanda’s past or other countries in the region.  
Rwandan control of aid and the genocide credit 
The Rwandan government is considered to have a strong ownership in the 
implementation of aid strategies70, and also to be able to lead the aid coordination process 
with positive results.71 Rwanda has exceptional control over aid compared to other African 
countries such as Ghana, Mali or Mozambique72. This is partly thanks to the use the 
country makes of Western feelings of guilt for not intervening during the genocide, which 
has allowed considerable independence from donors.73  
Rwanda is considered a regime not to be pushed, and the “genocide credit” is often 
used as an excuse to legitimize the government, while also serving as resistance to 
criticisms. Although Hayman concludes that “Rwanda is continuing down a path toward 
                                               
67 Christoph Zuercher. “An Introduction To The Project” in External Democracy Promotion in Post-
Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies: Rwanda. Rachel Hayman. Freie Universität Berlin. 2010.  Pg. I. 
68 Zuercher, pg. II. 
69 Rachel Hayman. “Going in the “Right” Direction? Promotion of Democracy in Rwanda since 1990”. 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, No.1, 2009. pg. 64. 
70 Rachel Hayman. “From Rome to Accra via Kigali: Aid effectiveness in Rwanda”. Development policy review. 
Vol. 27:5. 2009. Pg. 581.   
71 M. Carbone. "Between EU Actorness And Aid Effectiveness: The Logics Of EU Aid To Sub-Saharan 
Africa". International Relations 27 (3), 2003. Pg. 349.  
72 Hayman, pg. 591.   
73 Hackenesch, pg. 90.  
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democracy”74, she agrees with Stephen Brown and Andreas Schedler in defining the 
government as a “hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime”, where elections are held even 
though they are considered to be fraudulent. Likewise, the regime is also a “dominant party 
system”, since one political party, the RPF, dominates the political terrain. Brown points 
out that Western governments often tend to maintain support to sub-Saharan countries 
lacking real democratic systems. With regards to this, the Rwandan case is presented in his 
article ‘Well, what can you expect?: donor officials’ apologetics for hybrid regimes in Africa”, where 
according to them, criticism is not tolerated and the “genocide ideology” is with ease used 
against those challenging the regime75, under the generally permissive look of these 
Western donors.  The genocide credit is a relevant element which could give an alternative 
answer to the research question of this study. However, it has been disregarded due to the 
complexity of its quantification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
74 Hayman, pg. 74.   
75 Brown., pg. 516. 
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Theoretical framework 
This thesis analyzes the reasons why the EU used a cooperative pro-democracy 
strategy during a specific period of time in Rwanda, given the circumstances that were 
taking place. The following theoretical framework serves to guide the answering of the 
research question by narrowing down the research while providing a theoretical pathway. 
This section first presents the EU-Rwanda relation terms, and the democratization 
strategies classification, followed by the time frame. Finally, the comparison with Guinea 
and Niger is contextualized with an explanation of the indicators to be compared.  
The two actors involved in the research question are the EU and the Government 
of Rwanda. On the one hand, the EU is a supranational organization which, among many 
other activities, provides pro-democracy support to third countries. On the other hand, the 
country of Rwanda, one of the EU aid recipient countries, is an authoritarian regime. The 
relation between the EU and Rwanda is an important aspect to understand why the EU 
used a specific democratization strategy. In the previous section, the literature review has 
provided the clues about this relation. The programs towards Rwanda are designed and 
implemented by the EC, which is the executive body of the Union. Simultaneously, the 
Parliament, the Council and the member states also contribute to external relations by 
carrying out diplomatic actions. Due to scope, this study focuses on the EU as whole, 
disregarding the activities member states have performed individually. 
Christine Hackenesch’s model to classify EU pro-democracy strategies is applied. 
Hackenesch divides the possible response the EU gives to support democratic reforms in 
three strategies: confrontation, criticism and cooperation. As developed in the literature 
review, the three concern the use of different actions by the EU. For each period of time, it 
is possible to determine which strategy was used, in accordance with Hackenesch’s criteria. 
This classification is used in this analysis, as a clear way to differentiate and compare 
different countries and periods. 
The contemporary history of Rwanda is divided in three periods in this study:  1994 
- 2004, 2005 - 2012, and 2012 onwards. After the genocide in 1994, the country passed 
through a transition period that lasted for nine years, until 2003. Under the control of the 
RPF, the main Tutsi political party in Rwanda, the country recovered from the former 
dramatic situation. However, during those uncertain years the regime faced constant 
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opposition and instability.76 From 2005 under the leadership of Paul Kagame, who was 
officially president after 2003 elections,77 the regime stabilized, in part thanks to the 
application of tactics to prevent opposition78 and criticism.79 This stability remained until 
2012, when Rwanda was accused by the UN to be involved in the RDC conflict.80 The set 
of years between 2005 and 2012 constitutes the time frame scrutinized in this thesis.81 The 
fact that this demarcated time was more stable than the recent previous and future years in 
Rwanda is taken as an assumption which is supported by scholarship, thus Rwanda is not 
compared to itself before or after that period. On the contrary, in order to determine if 
stability and development could be the main reasons why the EU employed a cooperative 
strategy, the situation in the country is compared to that of two African countries: Niger 
and Guinea.  
Guinea and Niger have been chosen as relevant countries to be compared to 
Rwanda. As well as Rwanda, these countries were considered not to be “free” by 
international non-governmental organizations such as the Freedom House and, in turn, 
their respective governments have put in practice undemocratic practices, in a higher or 
lower intensity.82 In the three countries, the EU has contributed to the promotion of 
democracy during this specific period of time. However, unlike Rwanda, Niger and Guinea 
received a confrontation strategy by the EU, entailing the explicit use of political and 
economic sanctions.83 Thus, the different treatment by the EU is relevant for the decision 
of including these two countries as part of the analysis. 
Stability and development are the two key aspects of the hypothesis of this study: 
the EU employed a cooperative strategy because of the levels of stability and development 
present in Rwanda during that period. Considering the specific context of the country, the 
concept of stability is related to security and order. Rwanda’s own history of conflict and 
the favourable comparison with other countries in the region, such as the DRC, determines 
                                               
76 Reyntjens, pg. 180.  
77 James Astill. “Rwandan leader wins 94% of vote”. The Guardian, 27 August 2003. Accessed 23 October 
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/27/jamesastill.   
78 The Democratic Republican Front (MDR), the main party in the opposition, was banned in 2003.  
79 Hackenesch., pg. 90.  
80 United Nations, Security Council. “Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
addressed to the President of the Security Council “. S/2012/843. 15 November 2012. Pg, 3.   
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82 Del Biondo, pg. 242 -244.  
83 Del Biondo, pg. 242.  
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what can be understood as stability.84 Thus, in this thesis, stability is measured by the 
number of internal conflicts and number of deaths in the country. This information is 
taken from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, an online conflict database from Uppsala 
University, which is considered one of the most accurate data-sources on armed conflicts.85   
In order to test development, regardless of the level of democracy, economic 
growth and the human development index have been looked at. The average GDP growth 
experienced during the years under study is used; growth is by itself an indicator of 
development. Also, scholars suggest that economic growth is partly caused by stability86, 
which makes this indicator even more relevant for this study due to the positive correlation 
between the two elements. This is explained by the fact that higher levels of stability trigger 
higher levels of government spending, foreign investment and literacy among the 
population.87 The second indicator, the Human development index (HDI), considers three 
key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a 
decent standard of living. Even though these indicators show the broad picture, they 
provide with a standard to compare the general stability and development situation in these 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
84 Brown, pg. 519.   
85 Uppsala Conflict Data Program - UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University.   
86 Ranmali Abeyasinghe. "Democracy, Political Stability, and Developing Country Growth: Theory and 
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Method 
 A comparative case study is used to test the hypothesis of this thesis: the levels of 
stability and development in Rwanda during 2005 – 2012 are the main reasons why the EU 
chose a cooperative strategy. One of the assumptions of this thesis is that Rwanda was 
more stable during the period 2005 – 2012 than the recent previous and following years. As 
a consequence, in order to answer the research question, Rwanda is not compared to itself, 
but to other countries within the same time frame: Niger and Guinea. The hypothesis of 
this thesis could be valid if Rwanda turns out to be more stable and with higher levels of 
development than Niger and Guinea. 
Human rights reports annually published by non-governmental organizations, such 
as the Freedom House, has been used to assess the democratic situation in these three 
countries during the specific period of 2005-2012. The EU actions in each country have 
been acknowledged in EU official reports, such as the EC human rights reports.88 These 
documents describe the activities carried out by the EU in third countries and the specific 
distribution of the funds. The official EU press release data base, secondary sources and 
scholarship on the topic have been also widely used. Following Hackenesch’s classification, 
each strategy has been classified as cooperation, criticism or confrontation.   
The democratic situation and the strategy that the EU used in every country is 
firstly described, followed by a comparison of the three indicators defined in the previous 
section. Due to scope, the standard indicators are compared without disaggregation, which 
permits a general comparison between countries. This is particularly relevant for the HDI, 
which contains several different sub indicators that provide more specific information in 
different areas. In this study, the HDI as a whole has been used.  
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Comparative case study – Niger, Guinea and Rwanda  
The EU has been intensely promoting democracy since the signature of the 
Cotonou Agreement in 2000. With this agreement, the efforts in the promotion of human 
rights and democracy were intensified, bringing a new framework under which the EU has 
been applying pro-democracy strategies to third countries with the apparent aim of 
enhancing the democratic standards worldwide.  
Nevertheless, some argue that this promotion has been partly characterized by 
instrumental variation; critics affirm that the Union has been applying different approaches 
to very similar situations, depending on the circumstances. Rwanda is one of the recipient 
African countries in which the EU has operated democratization strategies. The African 
country is an authoritarian state where coercive practices and repression have been exerted 
to diverse sectors of the population, such as the political opposition or regime critics, 
whilst several incidents and undemocratic practices have been acknowledged by the 
international community without much reaction. Nevertheless, for the time frame under 
study, the EU did not confront the authoritarian regime but employed a collaborative 
approach instead. On the contrary, the approach taken in other countries, such as Niger 
and Guinea, was based on confrontation, albeit the elements involved were similar in the 
three scenarios. Why did the EU choose not to confront the government of Rwanda from 2005 to 
2012?  
Human and political rights had been violated by the coercive practices Paul 
Kagame’s administration used against Rwandans. An aggressive aid strategy from a big 
donor such as the EU could have helped avoiding these tactics, by applying pressure with 
the implementation of sanctions or the shift on aid. Yet, the EU took a collaborative 
approach. 
The hypothesis of this study claims that one of the reasons why the EU decided to 
use a cooperation strategy instead of a confrontation one is because of the levels of stability 
and development Rwanda enjoyed during those years, especially if this is compared to the 
situation before and right after the genocide in 1994. The relatively good economical, but 
mostly peaceful situation in the country could be the reason why the EU was reluctant to 
apply sanctions. The fact that Rwanda was stable during 2005-2012 is an assumption in this 
study, so the comparison with Guinea and Niger helps determining if indeed this stability 
could have influenced the EU in its decision at that moment. 
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 The following section compares Rwanda to two other African countries: Niger and 
Guinea. An overview about both countries is presented, with the aim to provide context 
and understand the similarities and differences between them.  
Guinea, Niger and Rwanda – An overview (2005-2012) 
Guinea 
Guinea has officially enjoyed multiparty democracy since 1991, when the system 
was implemented by its President Lansana Conté. However, rules were quickly adapted in 
his favour, so he could extend his rule.89 He finally stayed in power until his death.  
 The strategy used to force his stay in office was criticized by the EU since its 
application. In 2004, Article 96 consultations were opened, which constituted the first step 
to apply sanctions. Effectively, the aid budget was drastically reduced by €65 millions in 
200590. Progress towards democratization was made again in 2006, and in consequence the 
EU reconsidered and cancelled the imposed sanctions.  
The scenario changed again in 2008 when Lansana Conté died, and a military junta 
took power.91 To counter this move, the EU re-opened the Article 96 consultation hence 
sanctions were re-imposed. In addition to that, in 2009 a dramatic incident concerning the 
killing of 160 people by the security forces, in an opposition rally, triggered a drastic 
response from the EU.92 The attack was condemned as a “gross violation of human rights” 
and measures were applied: a strict weapons embargo, more sanctions and the suspension 
of the fisheries agreement.93  
The democratic progress improved in 2010, with presidential elections which led to 
the victory of Alpha Condé; the election was deemed legit by international observers.94 It 
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was the first peaceful rotation of power in Guinea. Nevertheless some of the sanctions 
applied in 2009 remained in place until 2014.95  
Niger 
 Niger enjoyed relatively good standards of democracy until 2009, when the 
President Tandja proposed a change in the constitution to allow the extension of 
presidential and term limits. After the negative response from the Parliament and the 
Court, the President dissolved these institutions and called for a referendum on the new 
constitution, which passed exceeding the 90% of the votes. In 2009, Presidential elections 
were hold, and Tandja successfully remained in power.96 As a response, the same year the 
EU suspended part of the budgetary aid, and Article 96 consultations were opened.97 
However, a coup d’état in 2010 shifted the leadership to a military junta.  Under the new 
ruling, elections were organized, following relatively free and democratic international 
standards. In 2011 the EU resumed aid, after the new President Issouffou was elected.98  
 Rwanda 
 The democratization process in Rwanda started in 1993 with the Arusha accords. 
After the civil war and the genocide, the RPF ruled Rwanda acting as the transitional 
government until 2003, when they officially reached power following Paul Kagame’s 
victory in the Presidential elections. However, irregularities and undemocratic practices 
(such as intimidation to the opposition or lack of competition) were denounced during the 
2008 and 2010 elections99. In 2008, for instance, international observers noted that the 
government even downplayed the real result from 98% to 76% to seem more 
democratic.100 Formal and informal practices to remain in power were applied during 
Kagame`s mandate. Nevertheless, the EU did not react to the violations and remained 
cooperative with the government during that period.101 Neither sanctions nor criticisms 
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were adopted, and aid was even increased by 30% in 2007, and a second 30% in 2009.102 In 
2012, Rwanda was considered by the EU as an “example of process made in recent years in 
good governance, sustainable development and the fight against poverty and hunger”.103   
 As the overview about the three countries show, the situations during the 2005-
2012 time frame differ from one another. Unlike Rwanda, Niger and Guinea received some 
sort of confrontational action from the EU. Formal aid suspensions were adopted in Niger 
in 2009, and politico-economical sanctions were repeatedly applied in Guinea. In contrast, 
Rwanda did not receive sanctions or criticisms from the Union, and was twice (2007 and 
2009) rewarded with an increase of aid during the same period, despite the fact that similar 
violations of human rights and democracy were taking place in the country.   
 It can be concluded that Niger and Guinea received a confrontation strategy from 
the EU, while it remained cooperative with Rwanda for that period. The following section 
presents the comparison of stability and development, followed by a sum of conclusions 
about the results. 
  Comparative case study – Stability & Development 
 The analytical part of this thesis is carried out through a comparative case study of 
Niger, Guinea and Rwanda. The two areas compared are stability and development. The 
first is measured considering the number of internal conflicts and deaths induced by the 
state or violent organized groups in the country. The second looks at the HDI evolution 
and the GDP growth during the demarcated years.  
Stability  
 The concept of stability relates to security and order in this thesis, due to Rwanda’s 
background in violence and internal conflict. Following this, the number of internal violent 
conflicts in addition to the number of deaths per year is used as indicator to determine of 
how stable each country was for a specific year. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which 
has been used as the main source, defines three kinds of violence: State-based, One-sided 
or Non-state based violence.  
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Only violence exerted by the government or other organized violent groups are 
considered as relevant indicators of stability, thus Non-state based violence is disregarded in 
this study.104 On the one hand, State-based violence refers to the use of armed force by the 
government to any other actor in the country. On the other hand, One-sided violence is “the 
use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against 
civilians, which results in at least 25 deaths in a year”.105 The number of conflicts looks at 
the number of internal isolated violent incidents, resulting or not in deaths. These can last 
for one or more days, but they can be counted as a single event. 
Table 2.  Number of conflicts and deaths in Rwanda, Niger and Guinea (2005-2011)  
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Rwanda         
# Conflicts 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
# Deaths 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Niger         
# Conflicts 0 0 22 13 0 0 0 35 
# Deaths 0 0 98 56 0 0 0 154 
Guinea         
# Conflicts 1 7 21 0 3 1 1 34 
# Deaths 3 15 45 0 160 1 25 249 
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program - UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University.   
As observed in table 2, during the analyzed period there are relevant differences 
between the levels of violence in the three countries.  
Guinea experienced recurring episodes of violence, causing causalities every year 
except for 2008. In 2009, a group of official security forces killed 160 people during an 
opposition rally, causing the most lethal episode in Guinea within this period106; the event 
triggered sanctions by the EU. In sum, 249 people died between 2005-2012 in Guinea 
because of State or One-sided violence, the highest rate among the three countries.    
 On the contrary, violence in Niger was concentrated in 2007 and 2008. After a 
decade of relative peace between the government and groups of ethnic Tuareg rebels, 
conflict broke out again in 2007. Active confrontation lasted for two years, mainly caused 
                                               
104 This is in order to filter out the influence of non-state groups which are not within the scope of this paper.  
105 Uppsala Conflict Data Program - UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. Definitions. Uppsala University. 
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https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/guinea 
   
 
 25 
by the unfair distribution of natural resources.107 Albeit no more casualties due to internal 
conflict took place after 2007, these two years caused the death of 154 people, in 35 
different episodes of violence.  
 Rwanda suffered two casualties during the period 2005-2011, resulting from a 
violent incident in 2009. From this comparison, it is observed that the country is by far the 
less violent, and in consequence assumed the more stable among the three states. This 
conclusion supports the hypothesis of this thesis.     
Development 
 Development is the other area this thesis takes into account in order to determine 
why the EU did not use a confrontation strategy towards Rwandan between 2005 and 
2012. The HDI and the GDO growth (and its variation over years) are the two objective 
indicators used in this analysis that help illustrate the level of development these countries 
enjoyed during the time frame.  
The first indicator used to analyze development is HDI. The following table shows 
the data per year and the variation between 2005 and 2011. Variation in this case is 
essential to understand and compare how the HDI has evolved.  
Table 3. HDI and its variation in Rwanda, Guinea and Niger.  
Country/Year 2005 2008 2010 2011 Variation 
Rwanda 0.391 0.432 0.453 0.464 +18,7% 
Guinea 0.358 0.377 0.388 0.399 +11,45% 
Niger 0.289 0.309 0.326 0.333 +15,2% 
Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human development Data. http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
 
Due to their low position in the HDI international ranking, Niger, Guinea and 
Rwanda are part of the Low Human Development countries. However, from 2000, 
Rwanda had a relatively higher position in relation to Niger and Guinea, which 
corresponded to a higher level of human development. Likewise, even though the three 
countries had a positive trend, Rwanda was the state with a higher variation between 2005 
and 2012, with an increase of 18,7%. Among the three, Rwanda is the country with higher 
and better evolution of HDI for the period 2005-2012, which supports the hypothesis.  
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The GDP growth is the second indicator to test development. Growth helps 
understanding the level of economic development a country enjoys in a given year. The 
following table presents the annual growth, in addition to the average growth per country, 
between 2005 and 2011.  
Table 4. Annul GDP growth and average for 2005 – 2011.    
Country/GDP % 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average % 
Rwanda 6.91 9.23 7.61 11.16 6.27 7.31 7.85 8.04 
Guinea 3 2.5 1.76 4.94 -0.28 1.94 3.91 2.53 
Niger 4.5 5.8 3.15 9.59 -0.71 8.37 2.31 4.71 
Source: The World Bank data bank. GDP growth (annual %).   
 
 Every year, except for 2010, Rwanda had the highest levels of growth, which is 
reflected in the total average for the period, being 8.4%: this supports the hypothesis of this 
thesis. The difference in growth was partly caused by the negative growth Guinea and 
Niger experienced in 2009. Scholars defend that stability directly affects development108; 
hence this negative figures in 2009 might be explained by the period of instability and 
violence both countries suffered during that year, as it has been presented in the previous 
section.  
Summary of the comparison  
 The previous section has compared three relevant indicators in order to analyze the 
situation and performance of Niger, Guinea and Rwanda. In the three cases, Rwanda is the 
country with better results in stability and development: it experienced the lowest levels of 
violence and the higher evolution of HDI and GDP growth. Hence, these results support 
the hypothesis. 
 Violence in Rwanda (deaths and isolated violent events) was particularly low in 
comparison to Niger and Guinea: 2 deaths against 154 and 249 respectively. Although 
Niger seemed to be peaceful throughout most of the period, it reached a peak of violence 
between 2007 and 2008. Meanwhile, Guinea suffered regular violent episodes over these 
years. This important difference might confirm that Rwanda was significantly much more 
stable than the other two African countries for the same set of years. 
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 In terms of development, the GDP growth average was also much higher in 
Rwanda during that period: 8.4%. This represents double the rate of Niger, and almost 
four times Guinea´s. 
  Despite being part of the Low Human Development countries, Rwanda held the 
highest position in the HDI ranking among the three countries. This means that life 
expectancy, access to knowledge and general standards of living were superior to the ones 
in Niger and Guinea, which might be translated into a higher level of development. The 
variation through these years is also more significant: 18,7%, meaning that these 
aforementioned elements experienced a better progression in Rwanda than in the other 
two countries. 
  
 
.  
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Conclusion 
It is acknowledged from scholarship that international organizations applying pro-
democracy strategies in third countries might confront authoritarian regimes when human 
rights are violated, with the application of different mechanisms to criticize or confront 
that can force governments to stop these violations. This paper has aimed to explain why 
the EU used a cooperative strategy in Rwanda during the period 2005 – 2012, despite the 
coercive practices the government was using to maintain power. 
The hypothesis presented in this thesis states that the EU applied a collaborative 
pro-democracy strategy in Rwanda partly due to its positive levels of stability and 
development. In the previous sections, the hypothesis has been proven: Rwanda has been 
compared to two other African countries, Niger and Guinea, which share a similar situation 
but which received a confrontation strategy from the EU instead. 
The completed analysis has concluded that Rwanda was not only more stable and 
developed in comparison to its own past and future years, but also to other similar 
countries; Rwanda enjoyed relevantly higher levels of stability and development during the 
understudied period than Niger and Guinea. Rwanda presented the best results in all the 
three indicators considered in this study: levels of violence, GDP growth and variation of 
the HDI. Violence was almost inexistent during this set of years, and growth was positive 
and sustainable. These results support the hypothesis of this thesis: stability and 
development were main reasons why the EU decided not to confront the government and 
take a cooperative approach instead. 
This study proposes the abovementioned explanation as a potential answer for the 
research questions of this thesis. However, due to the inherent limitations of research and 
the limited word count, other factors may also contribute to the answer. 
The fact that the government of Rwanda was predominantly adopting low-intensity 
forms of coercion instead of high-intensity ones could support the hypothesis too. This is 
because in these cases the EU can be more flexible in deciding which strategy to use, due 
to the lower pressure it might receive from other actors, such as its member states or civil 
society.109 This eases the overlook of human rights violations, particularly if other priorities 
or interests are involved. However, due to scope, the classification of high or low intensity 
coercion has not been in the comparison: it has been acknowledged from secondary 
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sources that coercion practices from the government were used in the three countries, 
without looking at the intensity of the techniques. Further research could consider this 
element to reach more accurate conclusions. 
This study has focused its research on three indicators, while disregarding other 
elements that could similarly be relevant. For instance, the genocide credit, which can be 
basically described as an informal sympathy from Western countries towards Rwanda due 
to the lack of reaction during the genocide, is an interesting element that could also explain 
EU decisions. However, the difficulty of quantifying this as an objective indicator has been 
the cause of its exclusion from this paper. In addition, the fact that Rwanda generally has 
an exceptional control over aid compared to other nations110 and considerable 
independence from donors111 could also be relevant to explain donors’ actions in this 
country. Likewise, this has not been included in this paper due to scope. 
 Other approaches could be applied in further research. Some of the indicators used 
in this thesis, such as the HDI or the GDP growth, can be disaggregated, which would 
allow a more in depth analysis and more precise conclusions. Moreover, a more extensive 
comparison between other African nations having suffered from similar dramatic episodes 
could also shed light on the reasons or motivations donors might have when dealing with 
this specific kind of recipient countries.  
Early in 2012, the EU publicly stated that Rwanda was an “example of progress 
[…] in good governance, sustainable development and the fight against poverty and 
hunger”.112 Later the same year, the EU “partially froze its financial support to the east 
African nation, dealing what may had been the heaviest blow yet to president Paul 
Kagame”.113 The conclusions reached in this thesis might be a starting point on the 
explanation of why this did not happen before.  
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